S.W.A.T. Teams vs. the People
Sara Steiner
Colorado Technical University Online
Abstract
S.W.A.T. teams were formed when the need for specialized teams of police officers to deal with dangerous situations such as hostage-takers and armed stand-offs became too risky for a regular police unit. Throughout the years the S.W.A.T. team has taken over certain police functions such as drug-related search warrants, when weapons are suspected of being involved. What is happening is the investigative research needed to secure a search warrant is not being done properly. Court orders are being issued very often on the word of paid informants, who are not very reliable. Innocent lives are being taken due to errors in the investigation and search warrant executions. With the use of all that deadly force mistakes happen in the heat of the moment, but not much is being done to remedy the situation. In fact, the federal government seems to be taking the lead in escalating the militarization of the police in America.
S.W.A.T. Teams vs. the People
An eleven-year-old boy lies face down on the ground; he has just been shot dead by a member of Modesto, California’s S.W.A.T. team. There were no drugs or weapons found in the home. His family wins a three million dollar lawsuit (Balko, 2010), with the taxpayers footing the bill. The war on drugs has taken another innocent life, and it is happening more and more frequently. Once peaceful police officers have become a paramilitary force with surplus military equipment provided by the federal government. The days of knock and announce and wait until the door is answered are over. The modern way is battering rams, flash grenades and assault weapons (Tierney, 2006).
Created in the late 1960’s, the Special Weapons Attack Team, quickly changed to Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.), evolved in response to high-risk confrontations with gangs, snipers such as Charles Whitman, the University of Texas bell tower gunman, and hostage situations with groups like the Symbionese Liberation Army (Reynolds, 2007). It was dangerous work, and the police needed more than their .38 specials to do it. The Pentagon was authorized to distribute surplus military equipment (Tierney). Moving forward to 9-11, and the threat of terrorists keeping our country on high alert, there is a need to mobilize a militarized response at a moment’s notice. Terrorism-fighting grants were offered by Homeland Security to equip even small town police units (Balko, 2008). Herein lies the problem; what does a S.W.A.T. team do in the long periods between hostage situations and terrorist attacks?
Looking at the situation, the incidents of snipers, terrorists and hostage situations are so infrequent, that the S.W.A.T. teams must come up with projects to keep them busy and pay for their operations (Tierney). Serving drug related search warrants was the next logical thing. The get tough on crime stances of career politicians have made government funding available for the war on drugs. Byrne grants are given to subsidize drug raids (Velazquez, 2010). The local police departments are “encouraged to be aggressive by letting them keep a cut of the drug dealer’s assets” (Tierney). And the overflowing surplus of M-16’s, body armor, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and even .50-calliber machine guns are blurring the line between domestic police and military soldiering. Older cops are complaining about “militarizing Mayberry,” but the younger cops are under the influence [saying], “who wants to patrol a beat when you could be playing commando?” (Tierney).
Looking back to the death of eleven-year-old Alberto Sepulveda, there is a pattern of mistakes that have not been remedied, and continue on to this day. The FBI and DEA worked with Modesto S.W.A.T. teams serving 14 raids that day, after a 19-month investigation. According to Radley Balko of the Cato Institute, before the raid the Modesto police had asked the federal investigators if there were any children present in the home. The feds replied “not aware of any,” when actually there were three children. Plus, there was no real evidence besides a charge of “using a telephone to distribute marijuana.” After nineteen months of investigation, it is obvious there was a lack in the research department. How could they not know about the children? What evidence did they have that there were weapons in the home? What information did they use to get that search warrant? Most of the resources spent by the police are going towards increasing offensive power, with little available to actual investigative police work (Velazquez).
Newspapers throughout the country have done investigations resulting in the following statistics: approximately 80 percent of the raids asserting weapons were wrong, and even when weapons were found they were mostly handguns. About one-third of the raids produced no contraband, and only a third again produced a criminal charge, with just a few percent leading to jail time (Balko, 2009). The cities reported on include New York City, Atlanta, Denver, Orlando, Palm Beach, and Lima, Ohio. When the Denver investigation was published, their former prosecutor Craig Silverman commented, “When you have that violent intrusion on peoples’ homes with so little result, you have to ask why” (Balko). Other people and groups have come out with statements, such as ex-FBI director William Webster saying in 2000 that we are “too enamored with SWAT teams, draining money away from conventional law enforcement.” Also another warning, which went unheeded, from a Marine major general in 1987 as he testified before the Senate as they were destroying the Posse Comitatus Act to help militarize the police:
One of [America’s] greatest strengths is that the military is responsive to civilian authority and we do not allow the Army, Navy, and the Marines and the Air Force to be a police force. History is replete with countries that allowed that to happen. Disaster is the result (Balko, 2006b, p.16)
Getting back to the issue of search warrants, oftentimes warrants are issued based solely on the word of informants who are liars and career criminals, and “that is a terrifying thought” says Radley Balko, in his editorial for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006a). The Alberto Sepulveda murder is not a singular event, and the Cato Institute has published an interactive map online titled “Botched Paramilitary Police Raids: An Epidemic of ‘Isolated Incidents.’” Visitors to this website can look up incidents by year, state, and type of action (i.e. death of innocent, death of non-violent offender, police death or injury, raid on innocent suspect, raids on doctors and medical patients, others). The totals as of 2006 are mind-boggling: 43 innocent deaths, 173 raids on innocents (including killing dogs), raids on sick old ladies in wheelchairs, and so on. Our own police departments, in the name of the drug war, are terrorizing communities across the country. People, who used to think the police were someone to call when help is needed, now are afraid for their lives. How can you be comfortable with the police as protectors, when they just blew apart the neighbors door, shot their dogs, held them at gunpoint for three hours, then figured out they had the wrong house?
According to Paul Kraska, Eastern Kentucky University criminologist; there were perhaps 3000 S.W.A.T. team actions per year in the United States during the 1980’s, now there are at least 40,000 each year (Davis, 2006). Paramilitary squads should be used for known violent, armed criminals. “The problem is that when you talk about the war on this and the war on that, and the police officers see themselves as soldiers, then the civilian becomes the enemy” (Kraska). This is reinforced by prosecutors who refuse to bring charges against a police officer because mistakes can happen in the “confusion of a raid” (Balko). But the same does not apply to civilians who think they are being robbed and shoot a police officer in self-defense. In addition the Supreme Court overrode the 4th amendment by finding that the evidence obtained in a no-knock raid can be used (2006). That ruling gives the green light to police and prosecutors to keep doing what they are doing, since they have the ultimate precedent of a Supreme Court decision stating that finding the contraband is more important than people’s rights.
There are several other points that need to be made about the flourishing S.W.A.T. teams taking control of drug-related search warrants. The assistance grants from the federal government are only for drug arrests, no federal money is given for anything not related to drugs; even violent crimes such as murder garner “no federal dollars” (Balko, p.10-11). In addition, something else irrational started going on during the Clinton era; a federal program to help hire police officers for “community policing” programs was started, which Clinton said was supposed to “build bonds of understanding and trust between police and citizens”. What really happened was the police forces used that money to hire more S.W.A.T. officers, including war veterans with the ‘Troops to Cops” program (Balko, p.14-15). While it is commendable to give the vets jobs, it makes it difficult to have the police officer mindset of “keep the peace and protect and serve.” When you dress, act, and have all the military equipment, you tend to turn into the military “seek out, overpower, and destroy the enemy.” The job of the police is to “protect the rights of individuals they serve, not to annihilate the enemy” (Balko, p.15).
Basically, there is nothing that can stop a S.W.A.T. team. When an innocent person dies, or they raid the wrong house and kill the pets, there is no conscience that they are doing anything wrong (Balko, Mccartney, 2009). They have been set up to be unstoppable. Neither the police chief nor the court system will hold the police responsible for their actions; it is up to the people of the United States. “Police raids should be videotaped in archival format that discourages tampering.” (Reynolds). As it stands now S.W.A.T. teams are operating under immunity sanctioned by the federal government, our lawmakers, prosecutors, judges and the Supreme Court. It seems like the only thing that can be done is once they have killed too many innocent people, too many pet dogs, arrested too many old sick ladies with oxygen tanks, and maimed too many children, then the citizens of America will finally get outraged and start protesting. How long will that take? With American’s love of violence it is hard to know the answer.
References
Balko, R. (2006a, December 4). Botched raids are not rare: Little oversight, bad information
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Balko, R. (2006b). Overkill: The rise of paramilitary police raids in America. 12-16.
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Balko, R. (2008). The Peacemaker. Reason, 40(7), 12-13. Retrieved from Academic
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Balko, R. (2010). Botched paramilitary police raids: An epidemic of “isolated incidents”.
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Davis, M. (2006, March 21). Death raises concern at police tactics. BBC News. Retrieved
From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4803570.stm
Hudson vs. Michigan., 547 U.S. 483 (2006)
Mccartney, R. (2009). Sheriff stands by his men at what cost? The Washington Post. B.1.
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